CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS
AND THE MARITAL IMMUNITY
THE TREND toward recognition of the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors,' there has developed a widespread corollary limitation rooted in the concept of marital immunity.2 Thus,
where Wife sues Stranger for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident which resulted from the concurrent negligence of Husband and Stranger, Stranger frequently can neither implead Husband in
the initial suit nor, should Wife recover a judgment, seek contribution
3
from him in a separate action thereafter.
The recent concurrence of two New Jersey cases,4 arising under a
newly adopted version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,5 pointedly demonstrates the logical and equitable insuflic-

PARALLELING

'THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 9 U.L.A. 156, was
approved in 1939 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, and has, to date, been adopted in nine jurisdictions: ARK. STAT. §§ 34-100134-1009 (1941)0;

O DEL. C. §§ 63o-63o8(1949) ; HAWAII

REV. LAWS

§§

10487-

10493 (I94S); MD. CODE Art. 5o, § 20-29 (.95o); N.J.S.A. zA:5 3 A-z-2A: 5 3 A-5
(i95z) ; N.M. COMP. L. §§ 21-118-21-125 (1947) ; 12 PA. STAT. §2082-2089 (1951) ;
Rhode Island 1940, c. 940; South Dakota 1945, c. 167.
2Any consideration of the marital immunity itself is beyond the scope of this note.
See PROSSER, TORTS § 99, at 898-904 (1941). In a state which allows tort actions
to be brought directly by one spouse against the other there is of course, no objection
to allowing the original defendant contribution against the concurrently negligent
husband. Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926).
I Zutter v. O'ConneU, 2oo Wis. 6oi, 229 N.W. 74 (1930)
(no contribution
against a father whose negligence contributed to the injury of his son); Ackerson v.
Kibler, 138 Misc. 695, 246 N.Y. Supp. 580 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd, 232 App. Div. 3o6,
249 N.Y. Supp. 629 (4th Dept., 1931) ; Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Gretakis, 162
Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (934), notes 18 and 22 infra (defendant railroad could not
implead father whose "gross negligence" contributed to the injury of his unemancipated
daughter); Yellow Cab Co. of D.C., Inc. v. Dreslin, 86 App. D.C. 327, 181 F.2d
626, 19 A.L.R.2d ioot (D.C. Cir. 195o ) ; Guerriero v. U-Drive It, 22 N.J. Super.
588, 92 A.2d 140 (1952), note 26 infra. [This case, the first involving marital immunity to be decided under the New Jersey Contribution Act, is noted in 26 TEMP.
L.Q. 453 (1953)]; American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Molling, 57 N.W.2d 847 (Minn.
1953), notes 15 and 20 infra; Ferguson v. Davis, 102 A.2d 707 (Del. Super. 1954).
Contra: Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945), notes 12 and 24.
infra.
'Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines Co., Inc. v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J. 372, 102 A.2d 587
(1954); Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, xo2 A.2d 595 (1954).
'JOINT TORTFEASORS CONTRIBUTION LAW, L. 1952, c. 335, P. 1075, § I et seq.;
N.J.S. 2A: 5 3 A-I et seg. (1952).

DUKE BAR JOURNAL

[VOL. 4

ency of such a result. In Kennedy v. Camp, Stranger was denied contribution against Husband on the ground that joint and several liability
of the tortfeasors to Wife was a substantive element of the right of contribution.6 By way of justification, the court relied on the inadequately
examined maxim that such a conclusion tended to preserve "the unity
of the spouses which is interwoven into the law for the domestic peace
and well-being that are conductive to the subsistence of the marriage re7
lation."
In the companion case of Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Rosenthal," however, the same court held that the right of contribution accrued to Stranger upon payment of the judgment and persisted even
in the face of the judgment plaintiff's subsequent marriage to the joint
tortfeasorY In thus concluding that Husband could not claim immunity from contribution by virtue of his subsequently acquired marital
status, the court stated somewhat cryptically that "the considerations of
marital immunity and domestic peace and felicity underlying the ancient
policy interdicting actions between spouses have no place here."' 0
Analytically, the rationale of the Kennedy case, that enforcement
of contribution against a spouse would impair the marital relationship by
affording "the means of rendering the husband indirectly liable to his
wife,"" would seem to compel a contrary result in the Rosenthal case.
Surely, Stranger's enforcement of contribution against Husband for a
judgment paid to Wife before marriage would constitute no less an
assault upon domestic tranquility than would enforcement of contribution for a judgment paid after marriage. 2 Conversely, if, as stated
in the Rosenthal case, contribution is an independent rather than derivative right and is "not to be confused with subrogation,' 3 then a

1

4 N.J. 390, 1o2 A.zd 595, 598 (.954).
7 102 A.2d at 599 (-954).
8 14 N.J. 372,

oz A.zd 587 (s954).
Similarly, in Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Co., 223 N.C. 647, 27 S.E.2d 736
0943), it was held that the subsistence of the originally essential common liability was
not necessary for the continuance of the independent cause of action to which it gave
rise; and, therefore, the original defendant was allowed to implead the concurrently
negligent municipality in favor of which the statute of limitations had run. In both
the Godfrey and the Rosenthal cases, the court failed to consider whether the allowance
of contribution might defeat the policy supposedly supporting the extinction of the
common liability as much as a direct suit would have done.
20

14 N.J. 372,

102 A.zd 587, 595 (954).

N.J. 390, oz A.2d 595, 599 0954)"
'" In Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 483, 40 A.zd 912, 916 (1945), note 3
21 14

supra, note 24 infra, the court allowed the original defendant to implead the husband
"provided that any judgment obtained against the husband, as additional defendant,
may not be enforced by the wife-plaintiff, but is only available to the original defendant by way of contribution."
1314 N.J. 372,

oz A.zd 587, 595 (-954)"
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contrary result should follow in the Kennedy case, since Stranger's
right of contribution there would be no less independent than that of his
counterpart in the Rosenthal case.14
A logical contrariety appears from the juxtaposition of these two
rationales, and the apparently antithetical holdings can be reconciled
only superficially by an acceptance of the rule that common liability
must originally exist to support later contribution. Inquiry into the
history of the doctrine of contribution, however, reveals the limited
justification for this requirement. 15
Actions for contribution were first allowed in equity, as against coobligors on a contract, by any obligor who paid the entire amount due.
This doctrine is said originally to have been "founded upon the principles of equity and natural justice, which require that those who voluntarily assume a common burden shall bear it in equal proportions."' 6
The fundamental basis of this right, then, was conceived to be the need
for an equitable adjustment among the responsible parties. 7 In its
original suretyship context, however, an indispensible prerequisite to
such a need was a common liability, the voluntary assumption of which
alone defined the relations of the parties in all respects. In a tort context, on the other hand, since the mutual rights and duties of the joint
tortfeasors are determined by law rather than by consensual arrangement, considerations of common liability to the injured party would
seem to be quite irrelevant to an equitable adjustment reflecting the
common responsibility of the joint tortfeasors for the tortious act, the
character of which is not affected by marital immunity.
Most courts have failed to make this distinction. Instead, by an
uncritical acceptance of common liability as "the very essence of the
action of contribution," they have unnaturally warped its development
"C f. Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 679, 39 A.2d 858, 86o (1944)
(original defendant not allowed contribution from judgment plaintiff's employer since
workmen's compensation precluded a common law action by the judgment plaintiff
against his employer): "The right of contribution is a derivative right and not a new
cause of action." Btt see, Central Banking & Security Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 73 W.Va.

197,

207,

So S.E.

121,

125 (1913)

(a case involving

contribution among sureties): "Nor is the right of contribution derived from the
equitable principle of subrogation. Contribution and subrogation are separate and
distinct things."
" A good review of the origins and foundations of the right of contribution is
given by Loring, C.J., in American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Moiling, 57 N.W.zd
847 (Minn. 1953), note 3 supra, note 20 infra.
10 13 AM. JuR., Contribution § 4.
'7 According to the Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 U.L.A. 156, that which engendered the Act was "the desire
for equal or proportionate distribution of a common burden among whom it rests."
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and engendered a technical discrimination not grounded upon policy
factors of sufficient moment to justify it. Considered apart from abstract
legal concepts, our sense of fairness rebels at the consequence-that
Husband reaps an indirect profit from his own wrongdoing because of
this unfortunate technicality.:.
The ease with which legal obstacles to effective contribution may be
surmounted varies, of course, among the several states according to their
legal bases for the action. In a state such as Minnesota, where contribution has been extended to joint tortfeasors by the common law,10 a
decision that this extension must invariably be attended by common liability restrictions20 would seem to be insupportable in light of what has
been said above. In other states, such as Virginia, where the right is
based upon statutory provision that "contribution among wrongdoers
may be enforced when the wrong is a mere act of negligence and involves no moral turpitude,"" the interpolation of a common liability
requirement 22 would be equally or even more indefensible, since the
remedial impact of a statute might conveniently provide the impetus
necessary to effect a break with the old suretyship rules and to formulate
a doctrine of contribution better designed for application in a torts context.
The most formidable obstacle, however, is encountered in the
language of the Uniform Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Act and
similar statutes in which the term "joint tortfeasors" is defined as "two
or more persons jointly and severally liable in tort for the same injury" (emphasis added).2 The only court which has yet relied on such
a statute to enforce contribution against a husband-tortfeasor 24 passed
"Illustrative of the injustices which might result from the application of this
marital immunity limitation is the holding in Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Gretakis, x62
Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (.934), note 3 supra, note 22 infra. The court there held that
the defendant railroad could not enforce contribution against the father whose gross
negligence constituted 9o% of the proximate cause of his unemancipated daughter's
injury, notwithstanding the fact that the father was completely covered by liability
insurance.
'9 Duluth, M. & N. R. Co. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W. 766 (931).
Other states which reached the same result without or before the aid of a statute are:
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Louisiana, and perhaps Oregon. PROSSER, TORTS § io9 at
1113-1114

(941).

20American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Molling, 57 N.W.zd 847 (Minn. 1953),
notes 3 and i5 supra.
21 CODE OF VIRGINIA § 5779 (1919), § 8-677, P. 439 (1950).
"2Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Gretakis, x62 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934), notes
5 and 18 supra.
"UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr, 9 U.L.A. 156, § I.
'4Fisher
v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 4o A.2d 912 (1945), notes 3 and 12

supra. Although the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 U.L.A. x56,
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over these words sub silentio, justifying its holding solely in terms of the
essentially equitable nature of the action of contribution.2 5 Such'a solution seems scarcely satisfactory. 2 Equally liberal courts, feeling impelled to reach the same result in a more straightforward way, might
perhaps interpret "liable" to mean "responsible" within the meaning

of the act 2 7 but such a circumvention seems artificial and vulnerable to
attack as judicial legislation. The greater likelihood rather appears to
be that the courts, when faced with the words of such a statute, will
resign themselves to the inexorable import of the language, adhere to
the position of Kennedy v. Camp and rule in the final analysis that

the remedy must lie with the legislature.'

RUSSELL

M.

ROBINSON

had not been adopted in Pennsylvania at that time, the Fisher case was decided
under the act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 1075, 12 PA. STAT. § zO8i (i94o), which provided: "Contribution shall be enforcible among those who are jointly or severally liable
for a tort."
2
'Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 487, 49 A.zd 912, 917 (1945). The court
stated: "We are of the opinion that the bringing in of [Husband] as an additional defendant in the action brought by his wife against [Stranger] was in the interest
of right and justice, and that to have refused to have done so would have been an
injustice to the original defendant; and that as no harm or injury resulted therefrom
to the plaintiff, the judgment should be affirmed."
"0The court, in American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Molling, 57 N.W.zd 847,
853 (Minn. 1953), disposed of the contrary decision in Fisher v. Diehl, supra
note 25, with the observation that "the case fails to discuss the 'common liability'
element of the action of contribution." And in Guerriero v. U-Drive It Co. of New
Jersey, zz N.J. Super. 588, 6oz, 92 A.2d 140, 147 (195z), note 3 supra, the court
distinguished the Fisher case by noting that the decision was reached "under Pennsylvania
statutes, but such could not occur under our Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Act with
its definition of 'joint tortfeasors' and 'joint liability.' "
"TIn Gray v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 31 F. Supp. 299, 3o6 (D.C.
La. 594o), the only case yet to arise in which the marital immunity as a bar to the
right of contribution between tortfeasors has been evaded on strictly technical grounds,
the federal court to which the action had been removed because of diversity of citizenship found that the plaintiff-wife had a substantive claim in tort against her husband
[CIV. CODE LA. Art. z4o (1932)], but that their marriage constituted a procedural bar
to this substantive right. CODE OF PRAcTIcE LA. Art. io5 (1931). The court held,
however, that this procedural barrier raised by the Louisiana statute was not presented
by Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the original defendant
was entitled to implead the husband of the plaintiff-wife because "we are to apply the
substantive law of the state and the procedural law of the federal courts."
"8Justice Jacobs recognized in his special concurring opinion in Kennedy v.
Camp, 14 N.J. 390, ioz A.zd 595, 6oi-6oz (1954), that "such policy as may possibly
prevail against tort actions betyeen spouses clearly has no bearing on situations which
do not involve any direct proceedings between them as adverse party litigants;" and
consequently he dissented "to the extent that the majority opinion suggests a contrary
view."
Considering, however, that the "statutory language is not sufficiently broad
to extend to the instant case" he felt compelled to agree with the conclusion of the
majority.

